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UPSIDE-DOWN JURIES
Josh Bowers
ABSTRACT—The practical disappearance of the jury trial ranks among the
most widely examined topics in American criminal justice. But, by
focusing on trial scarcity, scholars have managed to tell only part of the
story. The unexplored first-order question is whether juries even do their
work well. And the answer to that question turns on the kinds of work jury
members are typically required to do. Once upon a time, trials turned upon
practical reasoning and general moral blameworthiness. Modern trials have
come to focus upon legal reasoning and technical guilt accuracy. In turn,
the jury has evolved from a flexible body to a rule-bound institution. But,
of course, even as trials have changed, laypeople’s capacities have stayed
largely the same. Laypeople remain more skilled at the art of equitable
evaluation than the science of legal analysis.
It does not follow, however, that the criminal justice system should
revert to equitable trial practices. The modern trial is professional and
legalistic for good reason. The rule of law commands that criminal
convictions be products of precisely drawn criminal codes and formal
processes. Nevertheless, there are other procedural stages—arrest, charge,
bail, bargain, and sentence—where equitable discretion is more
appropriate. These are the stages at which criminal justice should
concentrate lay efforts.
In this Symposium Essay, I describe the historical and constitutional
trends that have entrenched popular participation in all the wrong places.
And I propose redirecting jury practice from criminal trials to other
adjudicatory sites. Finally, I make the case that my reforms are consistent
with (and perhaps even integral to) the legality principle, properly
considered.
AUTHOR—F. Palmer Weber Professor of Law, University of Virginia
School of Law. Thanks to my research assistant, Steven Keithley; to the
editors of the Northwestern University Law Review; and to participants at
the Democratizing Criminal Justice Symposium at the Northwestern
University Pritzker School of Law. All errors are mine.
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INTRODUCTION
The hallmark of the American jury trial is popular participation. The
lay jury has long been celebrated as a lay buffer against the “arbitrary
action[s]” of legal professionals—“against the corrupt or overzealous
prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge.”1 But there
is some reason to believe that the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right could,
in fact, undermine meaningful popular participation in American criminal
justice. Indeed, a number of prominent plea bargaining critics have offered
a version of this claim.2 They maintain that the contemporary jury trial is
just too costly to scale. As Albert Alschuler colorfully observed almost
forty years ago: “Here we have an elaborate jury trial system, and only
10% of the accused get to use it . . . . That’s like solving America’s
transportation problems by giving 10% [of drivers] Cadillacs and making
the rest go barefoot.”3 In the decades since Alschuler uttered those words,
the problem has grown only worse. As of 2006, jury trial rates for felony
offenders in state court had flattened out in the low single digits.4
I remain somewhat hesitant to sacrifice hard-fought procedural
protections in favor of some fictionalized historical ideal.5 Modern
evidentiary rules are important. And the right to counsel is indispensable.
1

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
“Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer have expressed support for the so-called ‘Philly
model’” that couples a ban on bargaining with stripped-down bench trials to lesser charges. Josh
Bowers, The Normative Case for Normative Grand Juries, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 319, 358 n.168
(2012); see Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652 (1981);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1984). John Langbein
has expressed support for the kinds of informal jury trials that typified common law criminal justice.
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 21 (1978) (proposing an
inquisitorial “streamlined . . . procedure” as “a middle path between the impossible system of routine
adversary jury trial and the disgraceful nontrial system of plea bargaining”).
3
Is Plea Bargaining a Cop-Out?, TIME, Aug. 1978, at 44 (quoting Albert Alschuler).
4
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL
TABLES 24 (2009), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf [https://perma.cc/MP8L-E4KB]
(noting that just 4% of felony offenders “were found guilty by a jury”).
5
Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 358–59.
2
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Nevertheless, it does seem that the full-dress jury trial, which Justice
Antonin Scalia once termed the “exorbitant gold standard of American
justice,” is just that—exorbitant.6 All the same, my immediate claim is
somewhat different. I intend to put to one side the question of whether we
can afford the “gold standard” to ask whether, in the first instance, the fulldress jury trial even is the gold standard. It might not be.
I do not mean to question the virtue or value of popular participation.
To the contrary, I am at least a reluctant proponent of criminal justice
reforms designed to promote democratic experimentalism and localism.7
But I worry that we have lost track of which questions lay bodies are best
equipped to consider and answer. Succinctly, they are particularly well
suited to evaluate the moral (and even prudential) questions of when and
whether it is equitably appropriate to arrest, charge, brand, and punish.8
They are comparatively worse at analyzing and applying formal legal tests.9
Here, I use the terms “evaluate” and “analyze” quite consciously. As
applied to criminal justice, the art of equitable evaluation is constructive. It
demands particularistic attention—a qualitative effort to contextualize the
offense and the purported offender. The layperson strives to understand the
whole story affectively—to use her everyday wisdom to reach sensible
determinations in light of the circumstances.10 The science of legal analysis,
by contrast, is deconstructive and rule-bound. The professional breaks legal
tests down to their constituent parts—or elements—and determines
whether the evidence proves each element according to the prevailing
burden of proof.11
Of course, the lines between the two crafts may blur. For example, an
adjudicator cannot determine whether a particular defendant acted
negligently or recklessly without first making a normative determination
about the appropriate standard of conduct or care.12 But, generally
6

Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 186 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Bowers, Normative
Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 358–59.
7
See, e.g., Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 331; Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 85 (2007); infra notes 68–83 and accompanying text (discussing where
and when I welcome popular participation in criminal justice).
8
Infra notes 42–67 and accompanying text.
9
Infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text.
10
Infra notes 22–29, 48–52, 59–67 and accompanying text.
11
Infra notes 30–39, 68–73 and accompanying text.
12
See Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point
of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN. L. REV. 987, 1019–21 (2014); see also LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND
JURY 184 (1930) (“[T]here is no method of ascertaining in advance whether conduct is negligent or
non-negligent. . . . As an element of legal responsibility it is at large, and defies the efforts of legal
scientists to bring it under more definite control.”); Roscoe Pound, Survey of the Conference Problems,
14 U. CIN. L. REV. 324, 332 (1940) (“The law cannot tell us exactly what is an unreasonable risk of
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speaking, there are procedural stages that demand somewhat more
evaluation and procedural stages that demand somewhat more analysis.
And the dominant conception of the legality principle, as it applies to
criminal justice, commands a high level of analytic exactness on questions
of statutory guilt—what I will call legal guilt. This contemporary emphasis
on formalism finds expression, most notably, in the constitutional
prohibition against vague statutes. But it may be found elsewhere, as well.
Juries are commanded to follow precise legal instructions. And modern
mens rea standards are given meanings more thoroughly defined than
abstract historical culpability concepts, like malice and moral
blameworthiness. These substantive and procedural rules and standards are
designed to promote rule of law values—like consistency, coherence, and
predictability.13
Elsewhere, I have criticized the dominant conception of legality as an
unwarranted form of rule fetishism.14 But formalism has its place. And, for
better or worse, the criminal justice system has made the trial the principal
place for formalism.15 But trials are not the only meaningful stages of
criminal justice. Cases are shaped and fates may be sealed by decisions to
arrest, charge, set bail, and sentence. These decisions permissibly may
remain relatively flexible. But significantly, these are also the very
decisions that, constitutionally, have been left almost entirely to
professionals. There are narrow exceptions. The capital sentencing jury
comes to mind, for instance. But noncapital discretionary jury sentencing is
almost nonexistent. And, even though grand juries are comparatively
widespread, their ability to exercise qualitative oversight—what I have
called “equitable discretion”—has contracted in lockstep with
contemporary jury practice.16 In both jury contexts, authorized lay
opportunities to evaluate cases contextually have been replaced by fixed
procedures and structured law, dictated from on high.17 Simply put, moral
and prudential questions are professional questions only. If lay bodies are

injury. It is unreasonable to define the reasonable. The reasonable depends on circumstances, and times
and places . . . .”).
13
Infra notes 30–37 and accompanying text.
14
Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12; Josh Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 166 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017) (on file with author).
15
Infra notes 68–74 and accompanying text (arguing that it may be appropriate to keep trials
comparatively rule-bound).
16
Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010); infra notes 22–34, 95 and accompanying text (describing historical
and current jury practices).
17
Infra notes 22–37 and accompanying text.
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consulted at all, it is often merely to rubberstamp technical legal
determinations.18
This is an unfortunate turn of events. Especially when it comes to
equitable questions of moral blameworthiness, laypeople are experts—
competent to reach determinations uncolored by certain problematic
institutional incentives and cognitive biases of the kind that may plague the
repeat player.19 My premise, then, is that the Sixth Amendment has
enshrined popular participation in the wrong place and as to the wrong set
of questions. By historical accident, the Constitution has locked laypeople
into the very roles they are least equipped to play—formalistic roles.
I favor lay bodies for their competency, not their legitimacy. On this
reading, the principal virtue of popular participation is grounded less in
democratic theory than moral particularism.20 Lay bodies are to be prized
for what they do, not who they are. They are means to the end of equitable
discretion, appropriately exercised. If I am right, then we would be wise to
get juries out of the business of analyzing legal guilt and into the business
of evaluating normative guilt and other relevant moral and prudential
considerations. In other words, we should want to move juries from the
trial stage to the stages of arrest, bail, charge, bargain, and sentence. And
we might even choose to export these normative juries to the very kinds of
cases and crimes about which moral minds tend to differ—mala prohibita
misdemeanors and other public order offenses.21
In Part I, I briefly trace and comment upon the historical development
of the jury. In Part II, I examine the need for (and exceptional ability of)
laypeople to exercise equitable discretion. Finally, in Part III, I revisit and

18
19

Infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
As I argued previously:

[The criminal justice professional] is the administrative and legal expert and ought to be
empowered to exercise significant discretion within these domains. But she has no special claim
against lay people to the evaluative art of equitable discretion. To the contrary, her equitable
perspective is complicated by her professional position, whereas the lay decision maker is free
to make moral judgments with fresh eyes that are unclouded by institutional incentives and
biases.
Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 332; see also Josh Bowers, Mandatory Life and the
Death of Equitable Discretion, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? 39
(Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2012) (“More than the professional, the layperson has the
capacity and inclination to cut through the thicket of legal and institutional norms . . . to the equitable
question of blameworthiness . . . .”).
20
On moral particularism, see JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT PRINCIPLES 1 (2004); infra
notes 53–60 and accompanying text.
21
Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 342 (“[W]hen it comes to the enforcement of
public-order crimes, equitable evaluation plays the more robust role.”); see also infra notes 68, 75–107
and accompanying text.
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introduce a set of proposals for normative juries. I explain that at least
some of these reforms are viable under current resource constraints.
Moreover, they remain consistent with our original understanding of (and
aspirations for) popular participation in criminal justice.
The proposed reforms are ambitious, to be sure. And I am not
convinced that we ought to adopt all of them. But some experimentation is
warranted. To the extent a significant stumbling block remains, it is a lack
of will more than impracticality. The institution of the full-dress jury trial is
just too deeply engrained in our ideas and ideals about criminal justice.
And the Sixth Amendment is largely responsible for entrenching those
ideas and ideals. The paradox is this: the legalistic jury underserves our
constitutional aspirations, but its very existence saps energy from viable
reform.
I.

THE HISTORICAL JURY

At the Founding, substantive and procedural criminal law looked
remarkably different. There was no professional police force. Laymen often
prosecuted cases. Grand and trial juries played principal (even dominant)
roles.22 And, because premodern juries were unencumbered by structured
criminal codes (and, for that matter, top-heavy rules of criminal procedure
and evidence), these juries were authorized to make normative decisions
about whom to charge and convict.23 Grand juries did more to initiate
charges. And these charges—statutory or otherwise—were structured less
and open more to interpretation by trial juries.24 At bottom, criminal law
was less about “applying a particular set of rules” than “keeping the peace”

22

Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Transparency & Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
911, 918–19 (2006) (discussing the historical prevalence of jury trials); Bowers, Normative Grand
Juries, supra note 2, at 323–29 (discussing historical influence of grand juries); Lawrence M. Friedman,
Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 247, 257 (1979) (noting that “the
rise of professional police and full-time prosecutors . . . put an end” to any time where “full-scale trial
by jury was the norm”); John Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 261, 262–65 (1979) (noting the historical evolution of the jury trial).
23
Cf. RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 64 (4th ed. 2016)
(explaining that, at common law, “the body of rules that define[d] the elements of crimes[] had little
meaning, since juries could decide what the law was on an ad hoc basis”); Bowers, Mandatory Life,
supra note 19, at 28 (“[I]t was the jury’s duty to declare the law’s meaning, and, when the jury shaped
the law according to a particularistic moral evaluation, the jury was just doing its job. . . . It was not
until much later that this robust and legitimate exercise of jury power was recast as unlawful
nullification.”).
24
As I have examined elsewhere, the historical grand jury played an especially powerful equitable
role. Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 329–43; see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand
Jury Discussion and Constitutional Design, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 703, 706 (2008) (“[T]he grand jury
was never designed as a mere sounding board to test the sufficiency of evidence . . . .”).

1660

111:1655 (2017)

Upside-Down Juries

through “a communal legal culture” that “depended on the presence and
participation of people in local communities.”25
Deep factual questions of motive and character were integral because
contemporary concepts of mens rea had not yet crystalized. Instead, the
operative measure of criminal culpability was “general moral
blameworthiness.”26 The aim, as one nineteenth-century legal scholar put it,
was to appeal to the juror’s “downright common sense, unsophisticated by
too much learning,” a mode of evaluation in which jurors engaged
independent of formal trial rules of evidence and procedure.27 Unlike today,
the prevailing model was neither due process nor crime control, but a
“summary process” model,28 whereby the jury sought “to do justice
between the parties not by any quirks of the law . . . but by common sense
as between man and man.”29
The historical approach was neither optimal nor ideal. Too much
moral reasoning and too little law can lead to criminal justice that is far
from egalitarian.30 But the pendulum has swung hard to the opposite pole.

25

Jessica K. Lowe, Book Review, A Separate Peace? The Politics of Localized Law in the PostRevolutionary Era, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 788, 793 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). See
generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2012) (describing historical shift
to professionalized criminal justice).
26
Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 994 (1932); see also JEFFREY
ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 31 (1994) (“[J]urors
generally had effective power to control the content of the province’s substantive law.” (quoting
WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 29 (1975))); JOHN HOSTETTLER, THE CRIMINAL JURY OLD
AND NEW: JURY POWER FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 41 (2004) (describing how the jury
“reflected the interests of the local community as opposed to those of central authorities”); Bowers,
Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 28 (“[A] given amorphous mens rea term typically operated as little
more than an arbitrary symbol into which decision-makers could pour the meaning they felt appropriate
for the case at hand.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
27
Edward P. Wilder, Trial of Issues of Fact—Jury v. Judges, 13 W. JURIST 391, 395 (1879).
28
Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 359. See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Plea
Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1979) (observing that historical “rapid trials”
have been replaced by “cumbersome and expensive” modern jury trials); Herbert L. Packer, Two
Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964) (describing the due process and crimecontrol models of criminal process).
29
William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 910 (1978) (quoting GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 297 (1969)); see also id. (explaining that eighteenth-century juries
were considered to be “good judges of the common law of the land” (quoting Letter from James
Sullivan to Elbridge Gerry (Dec. 25, 1779) (on file with Massachusetts Historical Society))). Consider
this grand jury instruction from 1759—that prospective charges “need[ed] no Explanation [since] your
Good Sence & understanding will Direct ye as to them.” NELSON, supra note 26, at 26 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
30
But cf. infra notes 45–50 and accompanying text (indicating the manner by which localism and a
balance of institutional authority and power may promote consistency and limit caprice).
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Substantive and procedural law has hardened into the set of casts we
recognize today. Whereas historical juries were arbiters of law and fact,31
modern juries are no longer authorized to shape law to accommodate even
the most compelling equitable circumstances. To the contrary, juries must
accept the law as judges give it. As the Supreme Court explained in Sparf
v. United States:
[I]t is the duty of juries in criminal cases to take the law from the court and
apply that law to the facts as they find them to be from the evidence. Upon the
court rests the responsibility of declaring the law, upon the jury, the
responsibility of applying the law so declared . . . .32

Moreover, the legal instructions that judges now give are
comparatively precise. Trial judges use pattern instructions to avoid sloppy
orders that may open convictions to appeals.33 Over the past century,
American criminal justice has come to reject almost entirely common law
criminality and likewise vague or otherwise open-ended statutes.34
We may call this transition the legality turn. It arose out of a perceived
“especial need for certainty” in criminal law.35 Louis Michael Seidman has
pointed to it to explain why “formalism continues to dominate criminal
jurisprudence” even though “realism’s lessons for criminal law seem
obvious.”36 The idea is that the exceptional stakes of criminal justice entail
special protections—protections that rigid rules better provide.37 Premodern
31

Supra notes 22–29 and accompanying text.
156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
33
Paul Marcus, Judges Talking to Jurors in Criminal Cases: Why U.S. Judges Do It So Differently
from Just About Everyone Else, 30 AZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 60–62 (2013).
34
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 86–87 (1968) (describing
development of the legality principle and concluding that “after centuries of retrospective law-making
by judges . . . the process of judicial law-making in the criminal field has . . . come to a halt” (emphasis
omitted)).
35
Stephen R. Perry, Judicial Obligation, Precedent, and the Common Law, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 215, 256 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jeremy Waldron, How Law Protects
Dignity, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 200, 217 (2012) (observing that the rule of law is especially important to
criminal justice because “its currency is ultimately life and death, prosperity and ruin, freedom and
imprisonment”); Kenneth I. Winston, On Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 37 (1974)
(discussing criminal law’s long tradition of “strict adherence to rules”).
36
Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law
and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 103 (1996); cf. Egon Bittner, The Police on
Skid-Row: A Study of Peace Keeping, 32 AM. SOC. REV. 699, 700 (1967) (“[C]rime belongs wholly to
the law, and its treatment is exhaustively based on considerations of legality . . . .”).
37
See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 988–95 (examining and critiquing the
prevailing perspective); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 201 (1985) (explaining that “appeals to the ‘rule of law’” as they apply to
the penal law tend to entail “the resort to legal formalism as a constraint against unbridled discretion”);
cf. Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different from All Other Rights?,
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 821 (1994) (explaining that criminal justice is different in kind from other
32
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criminal justice was considered just too formless to adequately protect
against official acts of caprice or abuse.
But there are tradeoffs and underappreciated costs. Grand juries have
become comparatively useless puppets of the state.38 And the influence of
trial juries has been replaced by the technocratic expertise of the
professional administrator (to wit, the charging and bargaining
prosecutor).39 She alone typically decides whom to charge and when to
initiate a bargain. And mandatory sentencing law has magnified her
leverage to compel guilty pleas. Lay trial jurors are left with little work to
do. And what little work remains is mostly formal application of fixed law
to fact. Equitable discretion is not absent from such a system. No system
can or should eliminate equitable discretion entirely.40 But the executive
agent is generally the only actor authorized to work the equitable levers.
Equitable power has been made the province of the prosecutor. It is hers to
bestow—if it is to be bestowed at all.41
Setting aside, for present purposes, the question of whether this
aggregation of equitable discretion is bad or good, the descriptive points
remain: even though jury practice has evolved significantly since the
Founding, our aspirations for the institution have remained largely
unchanged. The Supreme Court has continued to celebrate the “commonforms of legal regulation and that “liberty from confinement cannot be relegated to the status of
unprotected aspects of daily life”). Elsewhere, I have devoted considerable space to the claim that—at
least in some circumstances—a supplemental procedural and comparatively evaluative conception of
the rule of law could constrain the state better than a wholly formal approach. A procedural model
would provide even technically guilty individuals with meaningful opportunities to tell their stories and
demand understanding. Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 996–98; Bowers, Annoy No Cop,
supra note 14; see also infra notes 53–60 and accompanying text. All the same, I readily concede that
the legality turn has proven more good than bad.
38
See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 328 (discussing trope that the modern
grand jury would “indict a ham sandwich”); William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 178 (1973) (arguing that the modern grand jury “operates as a sounding
board for the predetermined conclusions of the prosecuting official”).
39
See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1660, 1706–12; Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note
19, at 25, 34–36; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Mercy’s Decline and Administrative Law’s Ascendance,
in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS 666 (Paul H. Robinson et al. eds., 2009) (characterizing the shift in
power from juries to prosecutors as a product of “a widespread belief in the administrative sphere that
there were right answers to be found by professionals with training and expertise”).
40
See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 340 (“[B]ias and discrimination are
endemic to any discretionary system. . . . [T]he immediate choice is not between a proposed
discretionary regime and a preexisting determinate . . . regime; it is the choice about who may exercise
equitable discretion . . . .”); see also Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 329, 347 (2007) (“[A]ll of these concerns are legitimate but far from fatal. Discrimination,
arbitrariness, and variations in temperament, eloquence, and attractiveness are endemic problems in
criminal justice. Remorse, apology, and forgiveness are at least neutral metrics and criteria to structure
and guide discretion.”).
41
See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1660, 1706–12.
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sense” of the jury over “the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic
reaction of the single judge.”42 Even Chief Justice William Rehnquist once
commented that the lay juror’s “very inexperience is an asset because it
secures a fresh perception . . . , avoiding the stereotypes said to infect the
judicial eye.”43 In other words, we have grown to prize the very notions of
equity that informed our original understanding of the jury, even as we
have neutered the body with an ever more legalistic trial structure and
substance. Today, the institution often fulfills its aspirational role through
subterfuge only, by nullifying law or otherwise operating extralegally.44
II.

COMPLETE JUSTICE

No stakeholder should wield equitable power exclusively. And there
are particular reasons to be wary about leaving this power to the
professional American prosecutor. Expansive criminal codes and draconian
mandatory sentencing laws make it just too tempting for prosecutors to
make guilty pleas the price of equitable punishment. Defendants who insist
on exercising trial rights are threatened thereafter with trial penalties.45 In
such circumstances, a popular body may provide a popular buffer between
the prosecutor and her incentives. A healthy dose of localism and populism
may serve to moderate otherwise draconian enforcement decisions and to
generate meaningful attention to (and affective understanding of) the
particulars of particular cases.46 On this logic, efforts to experiment
42

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); see id. at 157 (“[W]hen juries differ with the
result at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of the very
purposes for which they were created and for which they are now employed.”); Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (explaining that the value of the jury “lies in the interposition between the
accused and his accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen”); see also Louisiana v.
Taylor, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (discussing the need for a representative jury to “guard against the
exercise of arbitrary power”); State v. Pelham, 824 A.2d 1082, 1095 (N.J. 2003) (Albin, J., dissenting)
(“[J]urors, through their collective experience and humanity, are the conscience of the community . . .
[and] the best means of delivering justice.”).
43
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 355 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
44
See Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 33–36; supra notes 31–37 and accompanying
text.
45
See Josh Bowers, Plea Bargaining’s Baselines, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1083 (2016)
(examining coercion theory as applied to plea bargain practice).
46
Bill Stuntz has traced harsh modern penal policies to a lack of localism in criminal justice.
William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1969, 1974 (2008) (“[For t]he detached
managers of urban criminal justice systems . . . criminal justice policies are mostly political symbols or
legal abstractions, not questions the answers to which define neighborhood life. Decisionmakers who
neither reap the benefit of good decisions nor bear the cost of bad ones tend to make bad ones.”); id. at
2033 (noting that in the “sphere of governance, equality and local democracy go hand in hand”); see
also Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Forward: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1153, 1168 (1998) (arguing that there is “no basis . . . to presume that [criminal justice
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democratically serve as means more than ends—means to temper and
abolish contextually official opportunities for coercive conduct and harsh
treatment.47
It is no accident that Martha Nussbaum has defined the practice of
equity in criminal justice as “a gentle art of particular perception, a temper
of mind that refuses to demand retribution without understanding the whole
story.”48 Equitable discretion typically goes hand in hand with merciful
treatment and a capacity to appreciate and accept claims of normative
innocence.49 That is my aim—to create noncoercive conditions whereby
even a legally guilty offender might be able to articulate his story in an
effort to cultivate understanding and, possibly, mitigation.50 But what are
these conditions? In the first instance, we need unstructured standards to
“complement[]” legality’s conventionally rule-bound baselines.51 Beyond
that, we need an audience willing and able to hear and comprehend the
stories that unstructured standards invite.52 And this is where laypeople
come in.
My orientation, then, is not so much with radical democrats or even
civic republicans but with rule skeptics (think, for instance, philosophical
anarchists or virtue theorists).53 I do not prize popular participation qua
professionals] are better situated than the members of [local] communities to determine . . . a reasonable
trade off between liberty and order”); cf. ABRAMSON, supra note 26, at 18 (“[L]ocal knowledge . . .
qualifies the juror[s] to understand the facts of the case and to pass judgment in ways that a stranger . . .
could not . . . . [T]hey know the conscience of the community and can apply the law in ways that
resonate with the community’s moral values and common sense.”).
47
See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 324 (discussing the concept of a lay
screen, such as a grand jury, as “more of a quasi-legislative body than an executive or judicial
body[,] . . . a grassroots political [institution] . . . that serves to reshape the rough edges of the law in a
decidedly populist fashion”).
48
Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83, 92 (1993).
49
See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1678–86 (describing strands of equitable discretion).
50
See Jeremy Waldron, The Concept and the Rule of Law, 43 GA. L. REV. 1, 55–56 (2008)
(describing the adjudicatory practice of “offering both sides an opportunity to be heard” to be one of the
“elementary features of natural justice”).
51
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1221 (2010) (“[R]ules without clear methods of application may require
standards as complements . . . .”).
52
Infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text (discussing the capacities and experiential wisdom of
laypeople, and describing the manner by which unstructured standards invite moral deliberation).
53
Compare DANCY, supra note 20, at 1 (expressing the strong particularist account that “moral
judgment can get along perfectly well without any appeal to” generally applicable rules), and supra
note 48 and accompanying text (quoting Martha Nussbaum, a proponent of virtue ethics), and infra note
64 and accompanying text (quoting Lawrence Solum, another proponent of virtue ethics), with Heather
K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2005) (advocating disaggregated
democratic institutions as a means to empower political minorities and distribute participatory
experiences among citizens), and Joshua Kleinfeld, Manifesto of Democratic Criminal Justice 111 NW.
U. L. REV. 1367 (2017) (discussing philosophies of radical democrats and civic republicans).
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participation. Rather, I simply reject our overreliance upon rules.54 There
are overlaps, of course, between the democratic experimentalist and the
rule skeptic. Compare, for instance, Jeremy Waldron, who celebrates
citizens as “active centers of intelligence,”55 with Seana Shiffrin, who
likewise emphasizes popular “moral deliberation.”56 Both thinkers
recognize the “virtue of standards” and “evaluative ideal.”57 But Shiffrin is
more concerned with the manner by which “opaque” and “evaluative”
standards might promote the objectives of democratic experimentalism by
“empower[ing] citizens” and fostering “robust democratic engagement with
law.”58 For Waldron, however, the causal arrows flow the other way. He
favors popular participation principally because it is the most likely means
to produce moral deliberation and a quality of moral argument integral to
“[t]he procedural aspect of the Rule of Law.”59 It is Waldron’s “richer
conception” of the rule of law to which I am committed—a conception that
stands in “tension” with the dominant formalistic conception of the legality
principle and its overarching “ideal of formal predictability.”60
Laypeople are uniquely well suited to evaluate normative principles,
like fairness, dignity, autonomy, mercy, forgiveness, coercion, and even
equality.61 More to the point, laypeople are particularly good at desert
judgments. Questions of proportionality, blameworthiness, and social
responsibility are ultimately normative and evaluative, more than legal and
analytic.62 And I am far from alone in this assessment.63 The Aristotelian

54

See Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1025 (discussing the rules–standards debate
and resisting the criminal justice system’s prevailing emphasis on rules); Bowers, Annoy No Cop, supra
note 14 (same); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U.
PITT. L. REV. 227 (1984).
55
Waldron, supra note 50, at 59.
56
Shiffrin, supra note 51, at 1222.
57
Id. at 1222, 1240 (“[O]ne virtue of standards is that their lack of precision induces moral
deliberation . . . .”); Waldron, supra note 50, at 12 (“[W]e need to understand the facts of political life
and the reality of the way in which power is being exercised before we can deploy the Rule of Law as
an evaluative ideal.”).
58
Shiffrin, supra note 51, at 1214, 1218, 1227, 1240 (endorsing the “virtues of fog” as a means to
promote “deliberation and conversation on the ground, redounding to the moral health of both citizens
and a democratic polity”).
59
Waldron, supra note 50, at 5, 59 (“I do not think that a conception of law or a conception of the
Rule of Law that sidelines the importance of argumentation can really do justice to the value we place
on governments to treat ordinary citizens with respect as active centers of intelligence.”).
60
Id. at 8, 58; see also id. at 5 (“[O]ur understanding of the Rule of Law should emphasize not only
the value of settled, determinate rules and the predictability that such rules make possible, but also the
importance of the procedural and argumentative aspects of legal practice.”); Bowers, Annoy No Cop,
supra note 14.
61
Infra notes 62–67 and accompanying text.
62
As I argued previously:
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view is that human interactions are not captured well by rules.64 Moreover,
social science has shown that “lay judgments about core wrongdoing are
intuitional.”65 For the layperson, “the common concerns of life” are more
important that any mechanistic measure.66 These are the same common
concerns that courts continue to credit—consciously or otherwise—
whenever they champion “the good sense of a jury.”67

[T]he full measure of moral blameworthiness is to be found in neither code nor casebook, court
nor classroom. It is the product of neither executive nor judicial pronouncement. To the
contrary, it arises out of the exercise of human intuition and practical reason, applied concretely
to the particular offender and his act.
Josh Bowers, Blame by Proxy: Political Retributivism & Its Problems, A Response to Dan Markel,
1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 135, 136 (2012); see also Stephanos Bibas, Political Versus Administrative Justice,
in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 39, at 677 (“Deferring to government officials makes
sense when they possess technocratic expertise . . . . [C]riminal justice policy is much more about lay
moral intuitions than about apolitical expertise.”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1674 (arguing
that “a more particularistic focus on an actor’s blameworthy conduct better accounts for common moral
intuitions” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Jeremy Waldron, Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment: The Words Themselves, 23 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 269, 284 (2010) (describing a jurisprudential
approach that accommodates a more or less “shared sense among us of how one person responds as a
human to another human”).
63
See, e.g., Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1445 (1995)
(observing that an evaluation of moral blameworthiness involves an exercise of “practical judgment”);
Kyron Huigens, The Jurisprudence of Punishment, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793, 1820 (2007)
(“[D]esert for legal punishment is informal and particularistic.”); Stephen J. Morse, Justice, Mercy, and
Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1493 (1984) (explaining that proportionality provides no “invariant[
or] objective deserved punishment for each offensive act”); see also RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW 12 (4th ed. 2015) (explaining that, according to some commentators, “one of the
strengths of retributive theory is its sensitivity to contemporary community morality”).
64
ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 133 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed.
1988) (“[A]bout some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct. In
those cases, then, in which it is necessary to speak universally, but not possible to do so correctly, the
law takes the usual case, though it is not ignorant of the possibility of error.”); Lawrence B. Solum,
Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 206 (2003)
(“[T]he infinite variety and complexity of particular fact situations outruns our capacity to formulate
general rules.”); cf. Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (“[P]roblems are not
solved by the strict application of an inflexible formula. Rather, their solution calls for the exercise of
judgment.”).
65
Paul H. Robinson, Reply, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 39, at 62.
66
State v. Schoenwald, 31 Mo. 147, 155 (1860); see also Bibas, supra note 22, at 914, 931 (noting
that “[lay] [o]utsiders . . . focus on . . . offenders’ just deserts” and “care about a much wider array of
justice concerns than do lawyers, including . . . blameworthiness, and apologies”); Bowers, Blame by
Proxy, supra note 62, at 143 (“[R]etributive valuation relies upon particularized exercise of practical
intuition and intelligence, not on formal legal designations. It requires a contextualized commonsense
determination that is sensitive to all relevant circumstances.” (internal quotations marks and footnotes
omitted)).
67
State v. Williams, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 248, 259 (1855) (emphasis omitted) (discussing “the good
sense of a jury . . . that . . . take[s] a common sense view of every question”); see also supra notes 26–
29 and accompanying text (citing and quoting contemporary sources); cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
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But, of course, the layperson’s talents are not boundless. The pertinent
question, then, is when popular perspective adds value or virtue and when
it does not. This is why I remain opposed to (or, at least, deeply agnostic
about) trial jury nullification. The practice may serve as a needed corrective
to a particular normative injustice. But the law is left sullied. As I once
observed: “Equitable discretion is necessary and proper, but it also should
be kept in its proper place. Trials should remain principally about legal
questions; by contrast, other adjudicatory stages—arrest, charge, bargain,
and sentence—can appropriately accommodate exercises of equitable
discretion.”68
At trial, I remain committed to the dominant conception of the
principle of legality. Formalism fits well with the modern criminal trial and
the adjudication of legal guilt. And this is precisely why popular
participation no longer fits so comfortably there. That is to say, trials have
changed, but moral reasoning has not. What the Michigan Supreme Court
wrote in 1874 is equally true today—that lay jurors are “not likely to get
into the habit of disregarding any circumstances of fact, or of forcing cases
into rigid forms and arbitrary classes.”69
By contrast, legal professionals do much better at trial. They tend—as
a matter of temperament and training—to sort cases analytically into
predetermined categories, boxes, and types.70 This form of reasoning is
over- and underinclusive and thereby somewhat fictive.71 But it produces its
own kind of accuracy—formal guilt accuracy.72 In other words, when the
lawyer “generalizes, and reduces everything to an artificial system, formed

COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 61–62 (1766) (observing that “established rules and fixed
precepts” have the capacity to destroy equity’s “very essence” by “reducing it to a positive law”).
68
Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1685; see also Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra
note 2, at 338 (explaining that trial nullification problematically “renders law a subjective manifestation
of what the community believes it to be”). See generally Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury
Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253 (1996) (examining the practice of jury nullification as a threat to the
rule of law).
69
Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173, 190 (1874).
70
Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1048 (“[T]he lawyer is—by training, experience,
and culture—more inclined to categorize and less inclined to contextualize. To think like a lawyer
means to give one’s self over to a mythology of formalism . . . driven by the internal and ineluctable
logic of the law. It means pretending that . . . decisions are strictly rule-governed, whether they are or
not.” (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted)); see also Dennis Jacobs, Lecture, The Secret
Life of Judges, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2855, 2859 (2007) (“[J]udges have a bias in favor of legalism and
the legal profession . . . . It is a matter of like calling unto like.”).
71
See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1691 (discussing the manner by which formal rules
may “substitute hollow make-believe for life in fact”); Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 36
(“[T]rained professionals typically develop heuristics that may frustrate adequate contextualization.”).
72
Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1019–21.
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by study,” she is just doing her job.73 For this reason, some scholars have
suggested that trials should be bench.74 According to this view, technical
legal questions should be left to the trained professionals.
And I am inclined to agree—provided that some space is left for
evaluations of normative accuracy. My position is that there are, in fact,
two forms of accuracy: legal accuracy and normative accuracy.75 A legally
accurate determination attends to the rules. A normatively accurate
determination attends to the particulars. Both forms of accuracy demand
transparent attention in a system committed to Waldron’s “richer
conception” of the rule of law—which I have termed complete justice.76
The trick is only to determine how to harness each stakeholder’s respective
talents. There is a balance to strike; as Douglas Litowitz once remarked:
“[B]oth insider and outsider perspectives have an important role to play in
any comprehensive account of law . . . . [O]utside and insider perspectives
can mediate each other . . . . The goal is to play multiple perspectives
against each other in a kind of hermeneutic conversation . . . .”77 This
73

State v. Williams, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 248, 259 (1855). See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER,
PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW
AND IN LIFE (1991) (describing rule-bound reasoning as the craft of the lawyer).
74
See, e.g., Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 328; Campbell, supra note 38, at
178; Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 260, 294 (1995) (arguing that trained magistrates are better suited than grand jurors to answer
legal question of whether probable cause exists for charge); Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand
Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 45 (2002)
(arguing that “grand jurors are inherently unqualified to perform [the] statutory duty” of “evaluat[ing]
whether or not there is sufficient evidence to establish reasonable cause that the defendant committed a
crime”).
75
Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1019–21 (describing two conceptions of
accuracy).
76
Waldron, supra note 50, at 58; see Nussbaum, supra note 48, at 93, 96 (“Equity may be regarded
as a ‘correcting’ and ‘completing’ of legal justice. . . . The point of the rule of law is to bring us as close
as possible to what equity would discern in a variety of cases . . . . But no such rules can be precise or
sensitive enough, and when they have manifestly erred, it is justice itself, not a departure from justice,
to use equity’s flexible standard.”); Waldron, supra note 35, at 212 (arguing that exclusive attention to
“the clarity and determinacy of rules . . . is to slice in half, to truncate, what law and legality rest
upon”); see also Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 330 (“[C]omplete justice requires
law tempered by equity, lest it become, in Blackstone’s terms, ‘hard and disagreeable.’” (quoting
BLACKSTONE, supra note 67, at 62)); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1672 (“Complete justice
demands both the simple justice that arises from fair and virtuous treatment and the legal justice that
arises from the application of legal rules.”); cf. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two
Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 373–74 (1996) (“It’s when the law
falsely denies its evaluative underpinnings that it is most likely to be incoherent and inconsistent.”);
Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 154
(1997) (arguing that “[t]he moralizing that occurs with . . . criminal law” is “on balance a good thing”
and “probably inevitable in any event” but that it ought to be done “openly”).
77
Douglas E. Litowitz, Franz Kafka’s Outsider Jurisprudence, 27 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 103, 132–33
(2002).
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principle of allocating responsibility according to respective competency is
basic to good governance.78
But there is no real balance of power in modern American criminal
justice. To the contrary, the authority and power of the modern American
prosecutor make abuses of discretion and arbitrary treatment almost
inevitable.79 As Bill Stuntz explained: “[W]hen prosecutors have enormous
discretionary power, giving other decisionmakers discretion promotes
consistency, not arbitrariness. Discretion limits discretion; institutional
competition curbs excess and abuse.”80 Particularly when it comes to petty
order-maintenance cases, we need “a division of labor”—a partial
“outsourcing of equitable discretion from the professional actors who
currently possess almost all such power to the lay actors who currently
possess almost none.”81 These low-level cases are the very cases where
some measure of equitable discretion is anticipated.82 Yet these are likewise
the cases where police and prosecutors tend to underexercise equitable
discretion, yielding instead to their own institutional incentives and
cognitive biases, which motivate them to arrest, charge, and bargain
reflexively.83
78

See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW, at lx (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958) (“In a
government . . . each organ has a special competence or expertise, and the key to good government
is . . . figuring out which institutions should be making which decisions and how all the institutions
should interrelate.”); Bibas, supra note 62, at 677 (“Deferring to government officials makes sense
when they possess technocratic expertise.”); Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1676 (“By
embracing case-specific equitable valuation, the system is not any less consistent per se (even if the
inevitable inconsistencies are more apparent); in fact, such a system may even be more consistent and
less arbitrary, especially where normative judgments are made by locally responsive and comparatively
more transparent lay collectives.”).
79
See Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 35 (“[T]he risk of abuse of equitable discretion is
endemic—as is the risk of abuse across human endeavors. . . . The risk of abuse merely underscores the
need for conscientious institutional and legal design intended to express and cabin equitable discretion
optimally.”); Margareth Etienne, In Need of a Theory of Mitigation, in CRIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS, supra note 39, at 631 (“[T]o leave these hard [normative] questions in the hands of
any one institutional actor—the judge, jury (or commonly, the prosecutor)—is to leave that group
susceptible to accusations of caprice and lawlessness.”).
80
Stuntz, supra note 46, at 2039.
81
Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 359.
82
See id. at 327 (“[T]here exists something of a disconnect. Most lay and professional stakeholders
already agree that suspected murderers, rapists, and robbers almost always ought to be charged where
probable cause exists to support such charges. However, reasonable minds may, and often do, disagree
about optimal or fair levels of (or strategies for) enforcement of petty public-order offenses.” (footnotes
omitted)).
83
See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1660, 1701–02 (examining prosecutorial incentives to
charge); Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1000, 1008 (examining police incentives to
arrest).
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The notion of exporting trial juries might strike the reader as radical.
And it is. But that only goes to show the tremendous hold the constitutional
right has on our popular imagination. The Sixth Amendment casts a long
shadow. It has flipped the institution upside-down and stuck the jury in its
awkward place, relegating it to only resource-intensive full-dress trials.84
Juries are misplaced—procedurally and substantively. They answer the
wrong types of questions at the wrong stages, adjudicating only formal
guilt in the wrong types of cases. Consequently, they are left to play no
meaningful role in the borderline cases that raise the most significant
normative questions.85
III.

NORMATIVE JURIES

We should not be too hopeful about prospects for radical jury reform.
Reform is likely to remain impossible as long as the Sixth Amendment
occupies the field, sapping all efforts to critically reconceive of what it
means to be a “circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of justice.”86 All the
same, I have in mind five proposals—one of which I have already
described elsewhere in great detail, and four of which I will just sketch
lightly now. These are, essentially, five sites where a lay body might better
serve our aspirational hopes for the institution.
First, I have outlined a proposal for a normative grand jury, which
would presume probable cause and proceed directly to the normative
question of whether a prospective charge was morally or prudentially
warranted.87 I even described a practical means—involving summary
proceedings comparable to brief bail hearings—by which we might extend
these normative grand juries also to the kinds of petty cases for which
equitable screens are most sorely needed.88 Defense attorneys would
84

See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 323–324, 327; supra notes 31–41, 44 and
accompanying text.
85
See Deborah Ramirez, Affirmative Jury Selection: A Proposal to Advance Both the Deliberative
Ideal and Jury Diversity, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 161, 166 (explaining that it is “in those close cases
where . . . different perspectives . . . can generate results that are different”). A number of grand jury
proponents have made a version of this point. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 74, at 23 (observing that
“[t]he true power of the grand jury . . . manifests itself in the marginal cases . . . [where] the defendant
has a . . . sympathetic story to tell”); id. at 44, 50 (observing that juries are likelier to play equitable
roles in “cases on the margins”).
86
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
87
Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 347–49.
88
Id. Notably, this would be no great deviation from historical practice, when grand juries not only
exercised normative influence, but also commonly considered trivial misdeeds that would probably
constitute misdemeanors today. Leipold, supra note 74, at 283 n.120 (“Early grand juries might accuse
individuals of offenses such as . . . excessive frivolity, . . . failing to grind corn properly and ‘giving
short measure’ when selling beer.”); see also Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 324–25
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endeavor briefly—through a narrative recitation of equitable considerations
specific to the offender or the offense—to convince the normative grand
jury not to issue one, some, or all charges. And, because the normative
questions are nontechnical, the grand jury could do its work with little
instruction.
To be sure, the normative grand jury would look quite different than
the positive model. But, notably, some jurisdictions experiment already
with grand jury proceedings that allow for defendant and defense
participation.89 More to the point, the normative grand jury would exercise
a kind of latitude widely considered permissible.90 Charging is meant to be
a discretionary exercise. Indeed, this is precisely why some commentators
have rejected the pejorative label of so-called “grand jury nullification.”91
Their claim is that equitable charging discretion is not only institutionally
acceptable but welcome and anticipated.92 As Roger Fairfax explained, the
grand jury was never meant to be “a mere probable cause filter.”93
Second, we could imagine a normative sentencing jury. Indeed,
several scholars have done so already.94 Moreover, positive models exist
for such a body: not only do some states rely upon sentencing juries in runof-the-mill felony cases, but also a normative jury is constitutionally
required in capital cases at the sentencing phase.95 Previously, I proposed

(discussing historical cases in which grand juries refused to indict for equitable reasons,
notwithstanding obvious legal guilt).
89
Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 344–45.
90
Id.
91
Fairfax, supra note 24, at 708 n.10 (“The term ‘grand jury nullification’ is somewhat of a
misnomer . . . . [T]he term . . . does not capture the essence of the enterprise of the grand jury’s exercise
of discretion . . . and unfairly yokes grand jury discretion with petit jury nullification . . . .” (citations
omitted)); Simmons, supra note 74, at 48 (“The term ‘grand jury nullification’ is . . . a misnomer
because it equates the grand juror’s proper exercise of discretionary judgment with a trial juror’s
improper decision to acquit those whom have been proven guilty.”); see also Niki Kuckes, The
Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand Jury, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1265, 1269 n.19 (2006) (“[J]ury nullification . . . criticisms do not readily apply to grand juries,
which have the valid power to decline prosecution even on meritorious criminal charges.”).
92
See Bowers, Legal Guilt, supra note 16, at 1662–69. In then-Judge Warren Burger’s words, the
prosecutor “is expected to exercise discretion and common sense.” Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d
479, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
93
Fairfax, supra note 24, at 720.
94
For arguments in favor of jury sentencing, see Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury
Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003); Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA.
L. REV. 311 (2003); Adriaan Lanni, Note, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: An Idea Whose Time
Has Come (Again)?, 108 YALE L.J. 1775 (1999); Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Implementing Blakely,
17 FED. SENT’G REP. 106, 111 (2004) (“Greater jury involvement in sentencing ensures that sentences
do not stray too far from popular understandings of blameworthiness and fairness.”).
95
See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004) (noting that a defendant is entitled to frame
arguments for mitigation “in the most expansive terms”); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002)
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extending the equitable capital model to prospective sentences of life
without parole.96 We could extend a lite version of the same to all different
kinds of cases, including even misdemeanors. Of course, we would need
first to overhaul our mandatory sentencing laws (a heavy lift, beyond the
scope of this project). But if we could achieve substantive sentencing
reform, then the procedural reform—the normative sentencing jury—might
be an attractive next step. After all, equitable discretion fits more
comfortably with our objectives for sentencing anyway.97 In any event,
misdemeanor sentencing is typically discretionary already.
My last three proposals are a bit more ambitious and a bit less
conventional. I remain unconvinced that they are even viable. But that
should not keep us from experimenting cautiously. The first idea is a
normative plea jury.98 Especially in low-level cases, plea negotiations
resemble the kinds of everyday exchanges—sometimes heated, sometimes
cordial—that laypeople experience and understand. As Malcolm Feeley
observed in his famous examination of misdemeanor justice in practice,
these negotiations tend to have more to do with “fleshing out . . . the setting
and circumstances of the incident . . . [and] the defendant’s background”
than the legal merits of the pending charges.99

(requiring a jury to find aggravating factors necessary to impose death sentence); Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 822 (1991) (“[V]irtually no limits are placed on the relevant mitigating evidence a capital
defendant may introduce concerning his own circumstances . . . .”); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (observing that the capital sentencing body is allowed to consider “as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death” (emphasis omitted)); see also Bowers,
Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 25.
96
Bowers, Mandatory Life, supra note 19, at 39 (“[T]he layperson has the capacity and inclination
to cut through the thicket of legal and institutional norms (that are not the layperson’s stock in trade) to
the equitable question of blameworthiness that is and ought to be central to the sentencing
determination.”).
97
See DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 1
(1990) (noting that punishment falls short of societal expectations because “we have tried to convert a
deeply social issue into a technical task for specialist institutions”). Thus, Dan Kahan and Martha
Nussbaum endorsed a two-step approach to criminal procedure, distinguishing the legalistic conviction
phase from the more appropriately equitable sentencing phase:
In determining an offender’s guilt or innocence . . . the law evaluates her actions, . . . and at that
point, the law . . . is ordinarily unconcerned with how the defendant came to be the way she is.
But during the sentencing process, the law has traditionally permitted the story of the
defendant’s character-formation to come before the judge or jury in all its narrative
complexity . . . .
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 76, at 368.
98
On the possibility of plea juries, see Laura I Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731 (2010).
99
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT 179 (1979). Similarly, Milton Heumann recorded verbatim the very kinds of cursory
(yet consequential arguments) that a defense lawyer might make to a normative plea jury, particularly in
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Next, there might even be possibilities for a normative bail jury. Bail
proceedings are commonly both substantively meaningful and brief. When
we ask how these proceedings can be both at once, we get to the equitable
heart of the matter. It is because the practices of arguing for and against
bail have less in common with trial advocacy than with the narrative form
of short storytelling—a paradigmatic exercise of particularism.100 The
conventional bail argument entails an oral exercise that would be
comprehensible to the layperson without much legal guidance for the
simple reason that there is not much law to apply.
If nothing else, the use of a bail jury might reduce the frequency with
which prosecutors ask for bail in borderline misdemeanor cases. This
practice of setting so-called “nuisance” bail—typically, no more than a few
hundred dollars—may be tantamount to remand for indigent defendants.101
In this way, a bail jury could be a procedural mechanism for effecting
sorely needed substantive bail reform.102
Finally, and perhaps most provocatively, we could create a Fourth
Amendment jury. In a pair of recent articles, I have endorsed a qualitative
conception of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, which would limit the
authority of the state, at suppression hearings, from relying exclusively
upon comparatively rule-like quantitative measures of guilt, like probable
cause. Instead, defendants would be able to argue, at least in some
circumstances, that a search or seizure—even if legally supported—was
nevertheless equitably unreasonable (or “generally unreasonable”) and

a low-level case. MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 40 (1977) (“[H]ere’s a nice kid . . . he’s a college kid.”); id. at 109
(“Now look. He’s an old guy. He’s sixty-two years old, how about six months?”); id. at 151 (“Army
backgrounds, both with tremendous records in the service, all kinds of citations and everything else,
fully employed, good family backgrounds, no criminal records . . . . These men shouldn’t have felony
records for the rest of their lives.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Josh Bowers, Punishing
the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008) (describing equitable plea negotiations); Ronald Wright
& Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 38 (2002) (“[T]he
compromise outcome allows the prosecutor to respond to the equities in particular cases.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
100
See Bowers, Normative Grand Juries, supra note 2, at 347 (“[T]he bail determination relies on a
holistic understanding of the contextualized factual circumstances of the alleged incident and the
contextualized social circumstances of the alleged offender.”); cf. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE’S
KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY AND LITERATURE 110–15 (1992) (describing the novelist as a
particularist).
101
See Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, supra note 99, at 1135–36 (discussing the prevalence of
nuisance bail and citing statistics).
102
For sources and resources on bail reform, see Bail Reform: A Curated Collection of Links,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 30, 2017, 7:09 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/records/1439-bailreform#.lVConomrv [https://perma.cc/J7SJ-MMQX].

1674

111:1655 (2017)

Upside-Down Juries

therefore unconstitutional.103 In this way, a court could use an evaluative
standard to cultivate understanding of the unique perspective of the suspect
or defendant—an affective form of meaningful understanding largely
missing from prevailing doctrine. As Paul Robinson and I have examined,
lay perspectives on reasonable police conduct tend to diverge—sometimes
radically—from the professional perspectives of judges and justices.104
There are exceptions, of course—cases in which judges may bring lay
wisdom to bear. Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s thoughtful and probing dissent
in Utah v. Strieff comes to mind.105 Likewise, the Massachusetts Supreme
Court recently sought to understand—with reference to a scathing ACLU
report—innocent reasons why a young African-American man might run
from Boston police in a high-crime neighborhood.106 These judges strove to
put aside their professional training, experiences, biases, and perspectives
and do what laypeople do intuitively—to think and reason normatively. But
these exceptions are rare. Most judges tend toward the professional
approach—formalism over flexibility.
Rather than hope for the exceptional judge, it would be wiser to just
let the unexceptional lay body do the equitable work. Thus, we should
consider relocating the jury from its awkward home at trial to those
procedural stages where laypeople might do the normative job more
comfortably and less controversially.
CONCLUSION
My overarching objective—indeed, the animating notion behind my
entire research agenda to date—is not to cultivate popular participation in
103

Bowers, Pointless Indignity, supra note 12, at 1019; Bowers, Annoy No Cop, supra note 14. It
would be fair to describe the immediate proposal as a form of “popular constitutionalism.” See
generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (arguing for forms of popular constitutional review and enforcement).
104
Josh Bowers & Paul H. Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims and
Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 226 (2012)
(“Courts may endorse ostensible reasonable beliefs that the reasonable public does not, in fact, share—
that the public, instead, perceives to be either too deferential to the criminal class or, conversely,
insufficiently protective of [the privacy of] any citizen (save for the very paranoid).”); see also Dan M.
Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive
Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 888 (2009).
105
136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069, 2071 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Although many Americans
have been stopped for speeding or jaywalking, few may realize how degrading a stop can be when the
officer is looking for more . . . . We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely
targeted by police are ‘isolated.’ They are the canaries in the coal mine whose deaths, civil and literal,
warn us that no one can breathe in this atmosphere.”).
106
Commonwealth v. Warren, 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 & n.13 (Mass. 2016). Contra Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000) (holding that officers had reasonable suspicion where an
individual fled “[h]eadlong” at the sight of police in a high-crime neighborhood).
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criminal justice, but to reconceptualize what we think of as guilt in the first
instance. Legal guilt is but one metric—the trial metric. Normative guilt is
another. To my thinking, a wrongful normative penalty may be every bit as
abhorrent as a wrongful legal conviction.107 To minimize legal errors, I am
content to leave convictions and acquittals to professional experts. To
minimize normative errors, I invite reforms designed to cultivate common
sense and human flourishing—to let the layperson do what comes natural,
which is the nontechnical business of equitable discretion.

107

Bowers, Annoy No Cop, supra note 14 (manuscript at 66) (“The rule of lenity, the presumption
of innocence, the Double Jeopardy clause—these and many other procedural protections—are all liberal
devices designed to correct (and even overcorrect) for potentially arbitrary errors that could harm the
individual. And the costs of error extend likewise to moral arbitrariness.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Peter
Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal
Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1018 (1980) (discussing the liberal principle that “it is ultimately
better to err in favor of nullification than against it”).

1676

